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general historical propositions or agree that his facts and figures warrant his conclusions. I make myself no great pretensions to a knowledge of German history, but when Mr. Barker declares as a general proposition that the King of Prussia had during the nineteenth century more power than Napoleon I., he seems to me to show very little knowledge about the actual operation of constitutional machinery in Germany and still less about Napoleon. It seems to me to be conceded that the government in Germany was in the hands of a group of men who ruled partly through the imperial prerogative, partly through the Prussian legislative and administrative machinery, but chiefly through the Bundesrat. We learn also from Mr. Barker that modern Germany was the creation of the Hohenzollerns. One may query what he proposes to do with the generally accepted historical tenets about Stein, Maassen, and Bismarck. A not too extensive familiarity with Bismarck's correspondence would tend to show that his work was done despite a good deal of opposition on the part of the Hohenzollerns, and the least knowledge about Stein's life would prove that the great difficulty encountered in 1808 was the opposition of the crown. But when we find that Germany itself was merely "an enlarged Prussia", it seems clear that Mr. Barker's prime source of information on German history has been the Pan-Germanists and that he has read them with a rather hasty glance. Surely the history of Germany before 1870 will scarcely lead to the conclusion that Germany is merely an enlarged Prussia. The history of the German states since 1870 and their hostility to Prussia is scarcely consistent with Mr. Barker's larger proposition. It is a pity that a man who had so much to say that was true and who succeeded on the whole in saying a good deal so well should not have contented himself with his main proposition.

ROLAND G. USHER.

Impressions of the Kaiser. By DAVID JAYNE HILL, former American Ambassador to Germany. (New York and London: Harper and Brothers. 1918. Pp. 368. \$2.00.)

THE work has a "selling title" which does not do justice to its contents. It will prove a disappointment to the reader who expects from the former ambassador to Germany an informal record of personal and diplomatic experiences, such as have given to the pages of Gerard, Whitlock, and Morgenthau a raciness not always consonant with traditional ideas of diplomatic discretion and dignity. In Dr. Hill's work the personal element is hesitatingly introduced and in no way affects the serious and scholarly tone of the book, which is in the main a review of German foreign policy under William II., with an attempt to define the Kaiser's responsibility for the growth and expression of the war spirit among the German people. In some chapters, indeed, like those dealing with German relations to Great Britain in 1912 (ch. VIII.) and British efforts for peace, retraced in the light of Lichnowsky's memorandum (ch. IX.),

the figure of William quite vanishes into the background; and of the illustrative documents introduced at the end, at least one-half are quotations from official books and other sources to prove Germany's responsibility for the war.

In general, Dr. Hill's work suffers from this attempt to do two things: to set forth the character of William and fix his responsibility for the course of events in Germany and to trace the rise of the Great War as the necessary development of German foreign policy. For the student of history, the reaction of the author on the surroundings and events of the beginning of his ambassadorship in 1908-1909 (chs. IV., V.) will constitute the chief value of the book. His personal recollections of the Kaiser, the haughty temper of the Berlin foreign office regarding the arbitration treaty of 1908, the move of the Frankfort bankers to do a good stroke of business in defunct railroad securities (p. 102)—all reproduce the tense atmosphere of imperial Germany in the prosperous days which prepared its downfall.

On the other hand, the author's attempt to establish the responsibility of the Kaiser for the trend of German thought which culminated in the war reflects, perhaps unavoidably, the temper of the critical months of 1918 in which it was written. Viewed in the strictly "judicial spirit" which Dr. Hill claims for himself at the outset, he certainly convicts William, out of his own mouth and by well-authenticated acts, of egotism, love of theatrical display, an inordinate fondness for the show of power, a tendency to regard himself as the chosen instrument of God, and a firm reliance upon the sword. As to the other interesting question whether, through the skillful exercise of the imperial power, the Kaiser "wove into one solid fabric all the threads of German self-interest" (p. 53) and whether "a different kind of an emperor would have produced a different Germany" (p. 310), here the author presents a well-reasoned discussion, but his treatment of the evidence is that of an attorney for the prosecution and not of an historian. It is the lawyer and not the historian who presents statements damaging to the accused with no other source than "it is reported" (pp. 69, 174), or "it is said" (p. 173), or who tells a striking story of the purchase and destruction of an American magazine issue without the slightest mention of authority therefor (p. 115). The historian will demand a sterner attitude toward such sources as Bernstein's edition of the *Willy-Nicky Correspondence* (cf. *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XIV. 48, note) or of stories quoted as facts from Guillard's *L'Allemagne Nouvelle et ses Historiens* (p. 36) or Shaw's *William of Germany* (p. 64). He will ask for further evidence than that cited that William after 1905 "endeavored to form a close relation with Great Britain, in order to prevent an *entente* with France" (p. 83), or that the Emperor's attitude toward war is that it is a "great game" (p. 173). It is the lawyer and not the historian who could make the remarkable deduction from the ex-Kaiser's quoted expressions after the

assassination of Franz Ferdinand that plans had been formed between the emperor and the Austrian heir and that those plans, not having been published, must have been warlike plans (p. 239)! Finally it is the lawyer, not the historian, who in summing up overlooks such facts favorable to the accused as Italy's joint opposition with Austro-Germany to Serbian access to the Adriatic (p. 214), or who in reviewing Janushkewitch's testimony at the Soukhomlinov trial (pp. 287, 288), fails to state that the tsar's order to suspend mobilization was ignored by the Russian general staff.

ROBERT H. FIFE, jr.

The Cradle of the War: the Near East and Pan-Germanism. By H. CHARLES WOODS, F.R.G.S., Lecturer before the Lowell Institute, 1917-1918. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1918. Pp. xix, 360. \$2.50.)

THE foundation of Mr. Woods's useful commentary on recent conditions in the Near East consists in a dozen years of purposeful travel, of experience as a correspondent in peace-time and war-time, of careful study, of conversations on the ground, and of acceptable writing. After a preliminary sketch of recent Balkan history, he surveys rapidly the parts played by Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, and the Albanians during the war up to July, 1918. He then takes up in some detail a group of situations which have been objects of his special study: the military highways of the Balkans, the Dardanelles campaign, the operations near Salonica, and the Bagdad railway project. He concludes with a chapter in which he discusses the "Mittel-Europa" scheme, the "true basis of a permanent Balkan peace", and the disposition of the Turkish territories after the war.

The general attitude of Mr. Woods is that of most persons who know all parts of the Balkan Peninsula equally well, and who therefore see in a well-balanced recognition of the wishes of the people of the different areas the only hope that Southeastern Europe will cease periodically to produce world-crises and wars. Fierce partizans of any one of the peoples concerned cannot but be disappointed at his judicial attitude. Serbian and Greek propagandists in particular, who insist that the basis of settlement should rest largely upon each people's position on the winning or the losing side at the end of the war, cannot agree with his desire to do ethnic and economic justice to the Bulgarians and Albanians. Nevertheless his is that fundamental Anglo-Saxon impartiality, which may at times be disregarded temporarily amid the passions of war and the wrestlings of diplomacy, but which remains the basis of the success of the English-speaking peoples, not only in ideal leadership but also in far-sighted practical statesmanship.

One thread of purpose which runs throughout the book is to demonstrate that by reason of the "Pan-German" policy of keeping trouble